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I  have  the pleasure and the honour to  introduce to you 
Professor Dahrendorf, who will tonight be delivering the third 
Jean Monnet Lecture. Professor Dahrendorf does not need any 
introduction  in  university  circles,  but since  today  we  have 
many  friends  from  Florence, let me  just remind you  that he 
studied in Hamburg, and was  a post-graduate student at the 
London School of Economics, of which he is now the director. 
One of the problems of our Institute is  a lack of mobility in 
Europe - but Professor Dahrendorf is  a most distinguished 
example  of how one  can go  from  academe  into politics  and 
from politics back into academe. After having taught in several 
German  Universities,  most  recently in Konstanz, he  became 
Parliamentary Secretary in the Foreign Office of the German 
Federal  Republic,  then  became  a  member  of  the  European 
Commission where he was  in charge of its external relations. 
After  having  flown  around  the  world  several  times  in  this 
function and having had too little time to think and to write, 
he decided that it was time to go back to academe and agreed 
to become the first non-British director of the London School 
of Economics.  His publications are numerous;  it would even 
take  too  much  time to mention all  the languages into which 
1 his  publications have been translated.  Let me  only say  that, 
even before the present opening of China,  one  of his  books 
had been translated into Chinese. Before I now ask Professor 
Dahrendorf to speak to us, let me  add that he  has  not only 
published  books  on  many  sociological,  political  and  general 
subjects under his own name, but also written, while he was 
a Member of the European Commission,  a series  of articles 
under the name  « Wieland Europa », articles concerning the 
institutions of the European Community, the matter which he 
is  going to discuss with us tonight. 
These articles  were unorthodox, and they caused quite a 
storm in Brussels when they came out! We are very interested 
in hearing what he has  to say  to us  tonight - and  knowing 
Professor Dahrendorf I  can  assure you  already that what he 
has  to say will again not be orthodox! 
Last year, when the then President of the European Par-
liament, Signor Emilio Colombo, gave  the second Jean Man-
net Lecture, we sent Jean Monnet our feelings of deep grati-
tude for what he did for Europe. As we all know, in the early 
spring of this year Monsieur Jean Monnet unfortunately died. 
I  am  sure I  am  fulfilling  a wish of all of you  in sending the 
following telegram to his widow, Madame Silvia Monnet: 
« Aujourd'hui  le  Professeur  Ralf  Dahrendorf,  ancien 
Membre  de  la  Commission  des  Communautes  Europeennes 
et actuellement Directeur de la London School of Economics, 
prononcera la troisieme  Conference Jean Monnet. Nous pen-
sons avec la plus grande gratitude a  !'oeuvre creatrice deMon-
sieur  Jean  Monnet,  oeuvre  qui  pour  nous  taus a l'Institut 
Universitaire  Europeen  teste  une  source  constante  d'inspi-
ration ». 
Tonight we remember the man who has given his name to 
these lectures devoted to the problems of Europe. 
May  I  now  ask  Professor  Dahrendorf  to  speak  to  us 
about  «A Third  Europe? »  We  are  very  happy  that you 
agreed  to address us  tonight! 
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Today Professor Ralf Dahrendorf, former member of the 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  and  present Di-
rector  of  the  London  School  of  Economics,  will  be  giving 
the third Jean Monnet Lecture. We shall be thinking with the 
deepest gratitude of the creative work of Jean Monnet, which 
remains  for  all  of us  at the European University Institute a 
constant source of inspiration. 
Max Kohnstamm PROFESSOR RALF  DAHRENDORF 
A THIRD EUROPE? 
Jean Monnet  Lecture  delivered at the  European Univer-
sity  Institute,  Florence,  Italy,  on  26  November  1979,  at 
6 p.m. 
4 A  Third Europe? 
The invitation to deliver the  1979 Jean Monnet Lecture 
here  at  one  of the living  testimonies  of  the vitality  of the 
European  idea,  the  European  University  Institute,  fills  me 
with gratitude to those who invited me, with humility in the 
face of the greatness of the man whom it commemorates, and 
with the desire to offer a personal word of explanation about 
the reasons why the ideas of the founding fathers of a united 
Europe and those of my  friends  and perhaps my  own gene-
ration  differ  so  much.  Such  a personal remark must not be 
misunderstood; it is not my own experience that matters, but 
the question of how Europe appears in the light of the exper-
ience  of  those  separated  by  two  generations  from  that  of 
Jean Monnet, of Winston Churchill, of Schuman, De Gasperi, 
Spaak, and Adenauer. 
It is probably correct to say that these founders and others 
alongside  them were above  all motivated by the deep desire 
never to see a repetition of those horrible three decades from 
1914 to 1945 in Europe. They wanted to make sure that here 
in Europe, or at any rate in the free part of Europe, countries 
and peoples became linked in ways which made them feel at 
one  in  all  essentials.  Their Europe was  above  all  a  Europe 
without  civil  war,  and  they  have  succeeded  in creating  it. 
We have had by now, at least in this part of the world, more 
than three decades of peace. 
I  myself,  and  many  of my  generation, understand these 
motives of the founders  and respect them profoundly; more-
over,  we  reap  the fruits  of their success  with a  deep  sense 
of obligation. 
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were somewhat younger than the sexagenarians of 1945, but 
joined or followed  them in  order to bring about the reality 
of the dreams of Monnet, or of Churchill in his famous Zurich 
speech of 1946. I have had the privilege of knowing some of 
them,  including  Walter  Hallstein,  Sicco  Mansholt,  Edward 
Heath,  Raymond  Barre.  These  are  very  different  men,  but 
they were all motivated by the desire to realize the European 
dream in practical  terms,  and given  the prevailing theme of 
the 1950s and 1960s, this meant above all in economic terms. 
They  had  their  disappointments.  Hallstein's  conflict  with 
De Gaulle left its scars on him and on Europe's institutions. 
Mansholt's  agricultural  policy  never  lived  up  to  his  own 
ideals.  Heath's desire  to lead Britain into Europe succeeded 
and  yet  left  important  questions  unresolved.  Barre's  notion 
of economic  and monetary union failed  and  survived at  the 
same  time. On balance, however, these men and others with 
them have created the First and the Second Europe of which 
I shall speak- a solid construction which is today an import-
ant part of the politics of nations and of peoples. Again, there 
should be no doubt about my  respect and admiration for the 
sons  of the founding fathers.  Yet what they have created is 
fraught with question marks as  we go into the colder climate 
of the 1980s. Indeed, today, it raises as  many questions as it 
has  answered. 
What then is  the  Europeanism  of my  own generation? 
In part, it is  a natural feeling of belonging, of being at home 
in this Continent (even including some of its outlying islands). 
I  may  have  been particularly fortunate,  but I  do not think 
that  my  conclusions  are  unusual.  As  a  student after  1946, 
I  travelled widely,  and grew  to like Holland and Denmark 
(my  family  comes  from Anglia, thus from one of those focal 
centres of Europe, in this case of Germany, Denmark and the 
Anglo-Saxon  world),  I  fell  in love  with Italy.  In the  early 
1950s I  spent two years  in England,  at  the London School 
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versity of the Saarland- then still the Universite de la Sarre; 
indeed  during  the  referendum  campaign  of  1955,  I  set up, 
with others,  a liberal party which favoured  the Europeaniz-
ation of the Saar, though not its then leaders. A decade later, 
I went to Brussels as a Commissioner, where, in my last period 
in  office,  my  area  of responsibility included services  in both 
Brussels  and  Luxemburg.  Then,  as  you  know,  I  went back 
to Britain. And if I have not mentioned Ireland, or Greece-
or indeed the European democracies which for one reason or 
another have not applied for membership - noone should read 
any  sinister meaning  into  the  omissions:  Europe,  in  all  the 
vagueness of the geographical, not to say geopolitical notion, 
is  a reality of the existence of many  people today.  It is  our 
home.  There is  a sense of citizenship which extends beyond 
traditional  boundaries,  even if immigration officials  are  still 
a little perplexed when those who work in European institu-
tions produce European passports, and customs officials when 
they see « EUR » number plates on cars. 
Thus there is no doubt in my mind that European Union, 
that  unique  blend  of  co-operation  and  integration,  is  the 
obvious expression of what has come to be a fact. But - and 
this is a crucial caveat- this is not the whole story. The mean-
ing of the Third Europe (to which my analysis in this lecture 
will  be  devoted)  is  neither primarily one of the end of civil 
war, nor even that of the nitty-gritty of prosperity by creating 
a wider common market. It is  emphatically not the desire of 
some  of the founding  fathers  to  create  another superpower 
either;  to have as  much decentralization as  possible and only 
as  much  centralization  as  necessary,  is  a  prescription for  a 
humane society to which many, including myself, would sub-
scribe  today.  Europe is  not simply  an  ideal  either, a dream 
to  live  for;  despite  the  strong  sense  of linkage  which  goes 
with  the  experience  of  belonging,  there  is  nothing  wrong, 
indeed  there  is  everthing  right  about building political pro-
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Europe,  as  it corresponds  to  the  experience of a new gene-
ration of Europeans, is  rather in two things:  one is  the irre-
levance of borders for solving problems, and the other is  the 
need for common decisions where there are genuine common 
interests. Thus there must be no limits to cooperation across 
this great Continent of ours, and there must be a framework 
for  taking decisions  in  areas  in  which  no  local  community, 
region or nation is  the appropriate political space. 
If we  survey  the  history  of  European co-operation  and 
integration since  the war from  this  point of view,  the con-
clusion  which  suggests  itself  is  ambivalent,  not to  say  con-
tradictory:  European  union  has  been  a remarkable  political 
success,  but an  equally remarkable institutional failure.  So far 
as  the substance of European co-operation is  concerned, we 
have gone  a long way forward;  so  far  as  the framework for 
taking common  decisions  is  concerned, we have locked our-
selves into procedures and institutions which at times do more 
damage  than  good.  Unless  we  get  the  relationship  between 
the  two,  that is  between political  progress  and institutional 
foot-dragging  right,  we may yet fail  to live  up to the needs 
and interests of the peoples of Europe. 
Lest there be any doubt about our substantive, or, in the 
wider  sense,  political  progress,  let  me  remind you  of some 
obvious,  yet  notable  facts.  There  is  no  other region  in  the 
world in which contacts between political leaders are as  fre-
quent,  candid,  intensive,  and  volutarily  co-operative  as  in 
Europe. In foreign policy, there has been a remarkable process 
of rapprochement, backed up by the co-operation of represen-
tatives of the Community in the capitals and at the seats of 
international  organizations  all  over  the  world.  The  Euro-
Group of NATO has  become  increasingly important. In de-
velopment aid, the balance between national competition and 
European co-operation  with respect  to  developing  countries 
has shifted somewhat towards the latter. In the energy field, 
8 there is still much beggaring of neighbours, including environ-
mentally  indefensible  nuclear  developments  in border areas, 
but there is  also growing understanding of the need to co-ope-
rate. Central bankers, while they meet a mile or so away from 
Community borders in Basle, have developed a rapport which 
is  already  affecting  attitudes  to  money  supply  policies,  to 
inflation  in general,  as  well  as  to economic  policy.  Indeed, 
if one looks  at national economic policies,  a growing degree 
of parallelism becomes evident. Outside these obvious areas, 
there are  others, often technical or scientific,  about which a 
lecture of its own could be given. (Lord Flowers has recently 
done so in describing the emergence and success of the Euro-
pean Science  Foundation which he leads.)  Trade within the 
common  market,  tourism  within Europe,  academic  arrange-
ments between European universities, the European University 
Institute itself (though alas!  not yet the European « Brook-
ings »!),  to say  nothing of the three European competitions 
in  football,  others  in other sports,  in entertainment, in the 
arts leave no doubt at all about the fact  that Europe is  real. 
It is, to be sure, a strange kind of reality. «Now you see 
it, now you don't » one is tempted to say with a sigh. Perhaps 
we should not blame those from other parts of the world, and 
notably from America, whose exasperation leads them to con-
clude at times  that Europe does not exist after all:  there it 
negotiates, as  one unit, a GATT agreement, but cannot sign 
it because some  member states insist that they,  and not the 
negotiators, are the true signatories. More difficult still:  there 
are  countries  in  the  heart of Europe,  Switzerland,  Austria, 
Scandinavian countries,  which belong to Europe and yet do 
not join some of its institutions, to say  nothing of those in 
Eastern Europe who rightly insist that they too are Europeans, 
though they are not a part of any of the co-operative ventures 
beyond those set up by the Conference on Security and Co-ope-
ration in Europe. But however widespread the sneaking doubt 
whether Europe is after all a mere mirage may be let me state 
9 firmly and unambiguously:  in fact, if not in institutional prac-
tice,  Europe is  today a powerful reality both for  its citizens 
and in its relations with the world outside. Whoever ignores 
it, will  soon realize  its existence  and strength. The political 
success of European co-operation seems to me undeniable. 
However, it is  not matched by  similar  institutional suc-
cess. Indeed, the reason why some believe that there is no such 
thing as  Europe after all,  is  the dismal failure  of its institu-
tional ventures. If I use strong language to describe such fail-
ure,  this  is  not meant to criticize those who have  given the 
European construction their thought, energy and enthusiasm. 
They deserve  the respect and appreciation of all Europeans. 
But unless  one  exposes  failures  clearly,  we  are  not likely to 
get anywhere. And the contradiction between political success 
and institutional failure has become explosive;  in connection 
with the budget of the European Community and its Common 
Agricultural  Policy  it may  yet  threaten  the  European  con-
struction itself. 
In surveying briefly the institutional history of post-war 
Europe, let me leave the early history of institutional experi-
ments on one side.  Some  plans  died at the moment of their 
conception, others  through abortion by parliamentary opera-
tions;  except for  historians  they  are  of little interest today. 
There  are  however  four  sets  of  institutional  development 
which need to be looked at, some briefly, others in somewhat 
greater detail. 
First, there is  what was  once  the Organization of Euro-
pean Economic Co-operation. It was built around the Marshall 
Plan  and  served  a  useful  purpose  in  that connection.  This 
implied of course the involvement of the United States from 
the outset. It was therefore no accident that once the Marshall 
Plan had accomplished much of what it was  intended to do 
(at least in some countries), the organization was transformed 
into the Club of the Rich. As such, it continues to serve useful 
functions.  It has been said that it is  the most serious inter-
10 national  organization  insofar  as  policy-oriented  research  is 
concerned;  moreover,  it provides  a forum  for  co-ordinating 
policies,  especially  in the  economic  field.  But of course  the 
Organization of Economic  Co-operation and Development is 
no longer in any sense an instrument of European integration. 
Then there is  the Council  of Europe. It too  has  certain 
characteristic and unique functions.  Its membership is  more 
comprehensive  than  that  of  the  European  Community,  and 
notably includes the neutral countries of democratic Europe. 
The  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  may  have  its 
weaknesses, but it is important. Having to withdraw from the 
Council was a serious setback for the Greek colonels in 1969. 
A  similar  problem  may  yet arise  with respect  to Malta.  No 
country  likes  to  be  condemned  by  the  European  Human 
Rights Commission. Lord Scarman's suggestion that the Con-
vention should be read into British law as a new Bill of Rights 
testifies to its power. In addition, there are certain Council of 
Europe  activities  in  the  cultural field  which  have  left their 
imprint; here and there, one notes the effects of the European 
Architectural Heritage Year, or even of recommendations by 
«CCC»,  the  Committee  on  Cultural  Co-operation  (even 
though  it has  failed  to  facilitate  mobility  recently).  But on 
balance,  it is  hard to  avoid  the conclusion  that the Council 
of  Europe  has  settled  down  to  a  static  second-rateness  in 
limited areas of concern. 
This, then, takes us, thirdly, to the European Community. 
Here, a very long story will have to be cut very short. Perhaps 
it is  useful to begin by recalling that the Community was in 
many  ways  a  child  of  embarrassment.  Some  always  hoped 
that it would become, or even was, the political union which 
it was  not meant  to be  (and  they  were  not all  Germans); 
other never intended it to be more than a customs union with 
a few  frills  (and they were not all  French). Clearly,  neither 
its  three  constituent  parts,  nor  the  European  Communities 
as  united in 1967, ever faintly resembled all  the institutions 
11 of a united Europe with the Commission as  the great motor 
and quasi-government,  the Council  as  its  inter-governmental 
check and ultimate decision-maker, and the Assembly ... well, 
whoever reads the treaties carefully is bound to conclude that 
parliament never had much of a place in the contruction; of 
all the embarrassments it was, and is, the greatest, which may 
well contribute to its potential strength. But the main point 
is  that the institutions of the European Community were not 
those of a European political union of democratic countries. 
This fact was underlined by the policies of the Commun-
ities,  notably  those  of the European Economic  Community. 
In its first  twelve years, the EEC had a well-defined, import-
ant function,  which was  the creation of a customs  union in 
the widest sense of the term. Within this political objective, 
the Commission could play its part both by implementing de-
cisions  and by pressing for an  acceleration of the process. It 
could also  try, at times successfully, to add rudiments of new 
policies  by describing  them  as  part of a full-blown  customs 
union.  It is  important to remember that the Common Agri-
cultural Policy had its origin  in  this  context.  The argument 
was  that  in  areas  in  which  there  was  no  market  in  the 
member  states,  but  instead  a  government  policy,  the  only 
way to bring about a common market was to adopt a common 
policy. This applied to agriculture;  though in effect the CAP 
came  to serve  a  number  of  other,  partly unstated purposes 
as  well (to which we  shall  return presently). 
By  1970,  or more  precisely,  by  the time  of  the  Hague 
Summit of December 1969, this first phase of the development 
of the European Community came to an end. The Summit was 
dominated by the triptych which the French had christened: 
achevement,  elargissement,  approfondissement.  Achevement 
meant of course the completion of the customs union; it was 
an  essentially  technical  and  short-term  objective,  attained 
when  the  market  regulation  for  wine  was  adopted  in  the 
spring of 1970. Elargissement was a more difficult objective, 
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but one which had little relevance to the substantive develop-
ment of the Community. Necessary as it may have been- and 
inevitable  as  it may  once  again  be  today  - the enlargement 
of  the  Community  has  not contributed,  and  could  not con-
tribute  to  strengthening its  internal cohesion.  All  hope was 
therefore pinned on the third wing of the triptych, approfon-
dissement.  At the Hague, and in the  18  months following it, 
this  was  interpreted  as  the  programme  for  Economic  and 
Monetary Union, to be achieved within a decade, and by steps 
which in the various reports and resolutions at least, looked 
much like  those  that had led  to  the creation of the customs 
union a decade before. There is no need to describe in detail 
the dismal failure  of the Community's attempt to impose its 
own ill-thought-out calendar of economic and monetary union 
on a recalcitrant reality. Despite later attempts to save it, the 
beginning of floating in the early summer of 1971, only a few 
weeks after the first decision for closer monetary co-operation 
within the EEC, killed the idea of full  economic and mone-
tary union for  many years  to come. 
Since  that time,  the European Communities in  the strict 
sense of the Treaties have drifted into increasing irrelevance. 
In the absence of clear and overriding political purpose, the 
Commisson has been floundering, at worst serving as  a secre-
tariat  to  the  Council,  at  best inventing essentially  arbitrary 
projects of progress which rarely went very far.  The Council 
of Ministers has become largely technical.  It has complicated 
an already virtually incomprehensible agricultural policy to the 
point at which this is little more than an instrument for Min-
isters of Agriculture to get for  their farmers in Brussels and 
in  the  name  of  Europe  what  they  would  not get  at  their 
national Cabinet tables. In most other areas Council meetings 
are no more important - and often less pleasant - than those 
within  the framework  of OECD or the  Council of Europe. 
And  the  Assembly,  even  though  it is  now  directly  elected, 
remains an insult to true democracy, a travelling circus which 
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scribed  areas.  The  Communities  are  faced  not  with  crises 
- organizations which can generate crises have retained their 
importance- but with irrelevance. 
This is  an overstatement, to be sure. For one thing, there 
is  still one major crisis  which the Communities can produce 
and to which we  shall turn presently. For another, there are 
certain policies,  notably  in  the field  of development  and  to 
some extent in the active development of the customs union 
and in foreign trade, in which the European Communities have 
retained some  momentum. But beyond these, all  progress in 
European co-operation has come from a fourth set of institu-
tions.  It has  its own logic  that they have also  grown out of 
the Hague summit. For a time, they were associated with the 
name  of  the  then  permanent  head  of  the  Belgian  Foreign 
Office,  Vicomte  Davignon.  Since  then,  they  have  led  to  a 
new  set  of  quasi-institutions.  They  include  the  European 
Council  of  heads  of  government  as  well  as  corresponding 
meetings  of  foreign  ministers  and  their  political  directors. 
They also  include,  equally importantly, the European Mone-
tary  System,  the  birth  of  which  owes  much  to  my  distin-
guished  predecessor  as  Monnet  Lecturer  here,  Roy  Jenkins. 
It is important to realize that these new developments are not 
strictly Community institutions at all.  Strictly speaking, sum-
mits  cannot  take  decisions  which are legally binding on the 
Community;  the EMS  does not even include all  members of 
the Community, but is a piece of an Europe ala carte. Indeed, 
these  new  forms  of  intergovernmental  co-operation  were  a 
response  to the fact  that the European Communities as  such 
seemed to have reached the end of their tether. Because the 
Community got increasingly entangled in technicalities which 
had little to do with either the political concerns of members 
or even  the  European interest, new ways  had to  be found. 
Insofar as  any decisions of relevance for the future of Europe 
have been taken in recent years, they have emerged from these 
14 new  intergovernmental  arrangements  rather  than  from  the 
stale world of the Treaty of Rome. 
This  is  not to  say  that the European Council  will  solve 
the problems of Europe's future. There may be a case at this 
point for  turning to  a  topical  issue  which  will undoubtedly 
remain on the agenda beyond the European Council meeting 
in  Dublin  on  30  November.  The  issue  is  in  fact  a  telling 
example of the contradictions between the political interests 
of  European  union  and  the  technical  absurdities of existing 
institutions. I  am of course referring to Britain's demand for 
a  «broad  balance»  in  net  benefits  from  the  Community 
budget, and to the implications of the demand. 
The  facts  are  clear enough.  Given  the  system  in which 
the European Community collects its« own resources »,given 
further  the  peculiar position of Britain with respect  to agri-
cultural imports and intra-Community trade, given thirdly the 
prevalence of expenditure for agriculture in the Community's 
budget, Britain will inevitably become the largest net contri-
butor to  the budget by  1981. Estimates vary depending on 
different  assumptions,  but  there  is  no  dispute  that  Britain 
and  Germany  will  be  the  only  large-scale  net  contributors 
after 1980. At the same  time, Britain's GNP is  considerably 
below  the  Community  average.  What  is  more,  Britain  has 
paid for  its  membership by higher food prices than it would 
otherwise have had, and arguably by greater import pressure 
from  other Community members. 
There  is  a  degree  of agreement  even  on  the  interpreta-
tion of these facts. The policy of the British government is  to 
express its commitment to the Community- which is  appre-
ciated  - to  assure  its  partners  that it does  not propose  to 
break  the  law  - which  is  more  than  can  be  said  of  some 
others, though it remains to be seen what exactly the British 
Government  has  in  mind - and  to  demand  a  « broad bal-
ance » of contributions and benefits. It will be for politicians 
to try and find out how much room for manoeuvre the notion 
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not seem unreasonable. 
Yet - and this is  the reason for my raising this particular 
issue - given  the technical structure of Community policies, 
and  the  mixture  of  institutional  inertia  and  vested  interest 
which upholds it, it is virtually impossible to see how Britain's 
understandable demands  can  be  met.  There are  in fact  only 
two ways of achieving the objective. One would be to increase 
the  Community  Budget  by  a  considerable  amount,  such  as 
50 per cent, and thus make policies possible from which Bri-
tain  would benefit  more  than others.  This will not happen; 
indeed Britain itself will argue against any expansion of Com-
munity expenditure. The other is  to slaughter the sacred cow 
and  take at least some of the automaticity out of either the 
income or the expenditure side of agricultural trade and pro-
duction.  This  would require  a  truly fundamental  change,  in 
which the three incompatible functions of agricultural prices 
- to determine the income of farmers,  to influence levels  of 
production,  and to provide  external protection - are  at last 
dissociated.  Perhaps  not enough  thought  has  been  given  to 
the details of such changes; but even if it had, it is  clear that 
at  this  point of time,  they  will  not happen,  however  many 
politicians  may  privately  confess  to  be  in  favour  of  such 
changes.  Nor  is  France  the  only  culprit  in  this  game;  Ger-
many and some of the smaller members bear the same respon-
sibility. 
Some  would like to dismiss  this issue as  secondary;  they 
regard the sums  at stake as  « peanuts »;  they point out that 
Britain is  paying the price for entering late, or that it should 
develop its agriculture, or increase its intra-Community trade; 
they refer to attempts by the Commission to stretch existing 
adjustment  procedures  in  order  to  go  some  way  towards 
meeting Britain's demand for a «broad balance». Important 
as  all these matters may be, they miss the central point:  there 
is  a genuine desire  for political co-operation, even for Euro-
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the  European  Community  has  locked  us  prevent  us  from 
expressing  this  desire.  The  technical  tangle  of  Community 
policies  tends  to jeopardize  rather than promote unification. 
The tangle has to be broken, or else the objective of European 
union itself is in danger. To say that we have to start again in 
order to build Europe would be wrong;  there is  much in the 
acquis  communautaire which  is  worth preserving.  But what 
we  need is  more  than mere  adjustments  and  reformlets;  we 
need a fundamental reappraisal, and one which must have three 
main ingredients in ordes  to  succeed.  The first  of these is  a 
sober assessment of the European interest. It is  only natural 
that such an  assessment should begin with foreign policy. To 
some extent the first steps of European co-operation and inte-
gration were certainly conditioned by the Soviet threat as per-
ceived in the Cold War period. The threat has not disappeared, 
but insofar as  the European interest is  concerned, another re-
lationship has increasingly come to the fore, that is, the uneasy 
partnership  with  the  United  States.  For  some  time  now 
-perhaps since 15 August 1971 -it  has been clear that despite 
NATO, and perhaps even including NATO, the free world has 
to rest on two, if not three pillars. Europe's objectives may be 
similar  to  those  of the United  States  insofar  as  the preser-
vation of freedom  is  concerned;  but the fact  that Europe is 
not a  superpower gives  it a  special  ability  to  establish  and 
maintain  relations  which  serve  to  keep  peace  by  agreement 
where the superpowers can only do so  by domination. Many 
attempts  have  been  made  to  define  the  transition  from  a 
senior partner/junior partner relationship to one of presumed 
equality between Europe and America;  they have not really 
helped crystallize the new partnership. Yet, France has always 
been  right in  insisting  that a  self-confident  and yet friendly 
definition of European-American relations is at the very heart 
of the process of European union. 
A second set of common interests has to do with the issue 
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that Europe is  not a superpower;  for it is  by virtue of this 
fact  that we can hope to be in a position to offer  assistance 
without threats, co-operation without dependence. The Com-
munity  has  done  rather  well  in  this  respect,  though  much 
remains to be done. Some of the early theories of development 
have  turned out to be false.  Aid  is  not necessarily the most 
appropriate method of assistance, nor should we  delude our-
selves  so  far as  the assumption is concerned that the creation 
of indigenous elites will eventually lead to the trickling-down 
of wealth, education, and other opportunities. As we re-think 
some of the assumptions of our own socio-economic existence, 
we should think again about the poor countries too. In doing 
so,  we  will surely discover  that national competition for the 
favours of the poor is ridiculous, not to say shameful, and that 
Europe has  a crucial role  to play in setting up a more consi-
dered relationship. 
A third area of common interest again arises from the fact 
that Europe is  unlike the superpowers. We do not have the 
resources  to  maintain  our prosperity,  let  alone  develop  it. 
Europe, like Japan, is  dependent on peaceful and  unfettered 
relations  between  countries,  and  on  the  international  rules 
and institutions which guarantee them. European protection-
ism  in  GATT, or even  without GATT, is  a  costly  luxury. 
A  narrow-minded  policy  of  national  self-sufficiency  with 
respect  to  energy  supplies  is  equally  dangerous.  The Com-
munity has  not yet moved very far in defining common poli-
cies  in the field  of energy and of resources in general;  but it 
is  easy to see that Europe should, and that this is one of the 
main  items  on  the  agenda  of European  union  in  the years 
to come. 
A  fourth  area  of common  interest  is  different  in  kind; 
indeed  some  may  be  disappointed  by  the  manner in which 
I describe it. There are certain rules which, in an ideal world, 
should  be  world-wide;  in  some  cases  they  were world-wide 
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these, rules governing the monetary system figure prominently; 
the same is  true for trade, and may well come to be true for 
the  operation  of transnational  companies  and  other  aspects 
of international economic  relations.  In the  absence of world 
rules,  Europe  may  have  to  try  and establish its  own  rules, 
not as an objective in itself, but as a step in the right direction. 
A World Monetary System would be preferable to a European 
Monetary System,  but in  the absence  of the former,  a zone 
of stability in Europe is  not only highly desirable, but impe-
rative.  There  are  other  areas  where  Europe  has  to  take  a 
regional  lead,  but  make  sure  that  this  is  understood  as  a 
contribution  to  wider  international  action  rather  than  as 
inward-looking action which in the end creates new obstacles 
rather than removing those which exist already. 
It would be possible to go  on listing common European 
interests, though few others would be of similar importance. 
But however long this list becomes, agricultural policy would 
not - or, to be exact,  would no longer - figure  in it. I  am 
convinced  that  European  union  would  not  collapse  if the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy  collapsed.  It had  its  place  to 
cushion  a  massive  migration  from  agriculture  to  industry. 
It may have served to balance French and German economic 
interests. It may even have been desirable in order to diminish 
the  dependence  of  Europe  on  imports  of  foodstuffs.  But 
today,  it has  achieved  all  this.  I  have  yet  to see  one  single 
reason  why  a  Common  Agricultural  Policy  is  indispensable 
today in order to advance the European construction. 
This  however  leads  me  to  the  second  main  ingredient 
of  a  reappraisal  of  European  policies  which  is  necessary. 
I have often been struck by the prevailing view in Commun-
ity circles  that the  worst that can  happen is  any  movement 
towards what is called an Europe a  fa  carte.  This is not only 
somewhat  odd  for  someone  who  likes  to  make  his  own 
choices,  but also  illustrates  that strange  puritanism,  not  to 
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Europe has  to hurt in order to be good.  Any measure  that 
does  not hurt at least some members of the European Com-
munity  is  (in  this  view)  probably  wrong.  In any  case  it is 
regarded  as  unthinkable  that  one  should  ever  allow  those 
members  of  the  Community  who  want  to  go  along  with 
certain  policies  to  do  so,  and  those  who are  not interested 
to stay out. The European interest (it is said) is either general 
or it does not exist. 
I  believe  that  at  this  stage  of  European  union,  such  a 
view  is  not only  wrong,  but in  fact  an  obstacle  to  further 
European integration. To be sure, certain decisions have to be 
common. But even they should be decisions:  a budget which 
is  automatically fed and automatically spent is a monstrosity; 
it must be possible for politicians to set ceilings, discuss prior-
ities  and  thus express  interests.  A customs union requires  a 
common commitment; though it does not require measures of 
harmonization the economic importance of which is marginal 
while  the  psychological  damage  is  considerable.  Above  and 
beyond  a  short  list  of common  and  genuinely  political  de-
cisions,  however,  there  is  wide  scope  for  action a  la  carte, 
and  more  often  than  not  such  action  will  in  the  end  lead 
to  common  policies.  The European  Monetary  System  is  an 
example;  its  comparative success  exerts  a considerable  mag-
netic  force  on  those  who  are  not members.  In the field  of 
foreign policy, similar, though less visible developments have 
taken place.  Perhaps, the answer to the impasse of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy is to turn at least some of its aspects 
into a  la  carte  decisions,  binding  for  and financed  by  those 
who are  interested in  them.  Hill farming  was  a good begin-
ning in this respect; other areas of agricultural policy will, one 
hopes,  have  to follow  once the Common Fund explodes  the 
ceiling of the Community's own resources. The general point 
however seems to me of the utmost importance:  Europe a  !a 
carte, that is common policies where there are common inter-
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point of time,  join them,  must become  the  rule rather than 
the  exception,  if European  union  is  not  to  get  stuck  in  a 
mixture  of  incomprehensible  technicalities,  systematic cheat-
ing on the part of some, demands for exceptions which destroy 
overly complex systems, and a sense of frustration and misery 
all around. 
The  third ingredient of a reappraisal which seems  to me 
imperative has to do with institutions, and concerns the Com-
mission. At the time of this lecture, the Three Wise Men have 
only just reported; not having seen their report, I cannot com-
ment on their suggestions. The point which I  want to make 
is  that  the  present position - and as  a consequence  compo-
sition - of the Commission of the European Communities has 
become an obstacle to European union rather than a motor of 
progress.  This  has  nothing  to  do  with individuals  and  the 
efforts which they put into their work; in this respect, the Com-
missions  of recent years  have  shown an improvement rather 
than a deterioration. The much-praised Hallstein Commission 
operated after all  within a clearly defined framework of po-
litical objectives - and a framework not defined by the Com-
mission  itself.  Its influence was  in reminding member states 
of their own commitments, not in  devising new policies  and 
persuading members to adopt them. The Commission had its 
well-defined but circumscribed place in the First Europe, the 
years until the Hague Summit of 1969. But as the Community 
ran out of its sense of purpose, the Commission was bound 
to run out of steam. Despite the fact that of the Commission 
of which  I  had the honour to be a member, one is  today a 
Head of State, one a Prime Minister, two are  Foreign Min-
isters,  two  others  are  prominent  members  of  governments, 
the Commission is not, and could not be a political institution: 
its  subjects  of concern  may  have  been,  and  continue  to  be 
political;  but in the absence  of a political base,  it was,  and 
continues to be an unhappy administration suspended in mid-
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litical decisions  which it cannot reach. The Commission was 
meant to be the source of initiative in a Community in which 
ultimate  decisions  were  taken  by  the  Council  of  Ministers, 
and the Assembly was hardly more than an institutional after-
thought,  a democratic  figleaf.  But where  is  the Commission 
going  to take its  initiatives from?  Why should its members 
be privileged to introduce their private whims and fancies into 
Community policies?  They are not, of course, and as  a result 
the  Commission  becomes  partly  a  broker  between  member 
states,  partly  a  somewhat  soft-spoken  European conscience, 
and partly a bureaucratic machinery unattached to any trans-
mission belt to decisions. 
In my view, the fundamental idea of the Treaty of Rome 
1s  not wrong. An institutionalized dialectic of European and 
national interest is  necessary;  it also makes sense to give the 
right of initiative to the European element in this exchange, 
and  the right of decision  to  the assembled  national  interest. 
What was  wrong about  the Treaty of Rome,  and continues 
to  vitiate  European  progress,  is  that while  the  Council  of 
Ministers had an obvious basis of legitimacy, the Commission 
did not.  This is  closely  connected with the bureaucratic ap-
proach  that characterizes  the institutions of the Community 
throughout, and notably with the fact  that the Assembly has 
no positive function.  The obvious way of solving this dilem-
ma is  to take the simple, yet apparently infinitely complicated 
step  to have  the  Commission  elected by  Parliament.  Unless 
and until  that happens,  neither the Commission  nor Parlia-
ment will have  any  significant  role  to play in the European 
construction; indeed the irrelevance of the institutions of the 
Community will grow.  There are of course many  arguments 
against a Commission through which Parliament actually sits 
at  the  Council  table;  they  range  from  fear  of  Commission 
power  to  fear  of  political  one-sidedness,  to  say  nothing  of 
the  general  reluctance  to  change  any  article  of  the  Treaty 
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is  minor;  it relates  to the method of appointment and thus 
the responsibility of the Commission and nothing else. At the 
same time, such a change would give the institutions new life, 
introduce an element of genuine democracy into the Commu-
nity, and identify the sources of both initiative and decisions 
for everyone to see. 
I  do not suggest these ideas with any hope of immediate 
success, or even of change in the medium term. Indeed, it is 
conceivable that the irrelevance of the European Community 
is  already  so  far  advanced that a totally new beginning will 
be necessary  to  make progress.  But I  would argue  that the 
three  ingredients  of  a  reappraisal  of Europe  which  I  have 
suggested - emphasis on the European interest, readiness to 
accept an  Europe a  la  carte, political legitimacy for the Com-
mission  - are  sufficiently  close  to  recent  developments  to 
make some sense. For (to return to the initial personal state-
ments) the time has come to bridge the gap between Europe's 
political  progress  and its institutional failure.  The only way 
in  which  this  can be done is  by fundamental  changes.  The 
First Europe  was  in  itself plausible.  Its political  objectives 
may  have  been  limited;  they  were  largely  confined  to  an 
extended  interpretation of  a  customs  union;  but under  the 
circumstances  they  were  both  important  and  realistic.  The 
institutions which were set up to implement these objectives 
were adequate to the task. Until1970, the story of European 
integration is  one of  the successful  combination  of political 
intentions and institutional instruments. 
The  decade  which  has  passed  since  then is  that of  the 
Second  Europe.  It presents  a  picture  of confusion  and  un-
certainty. The discovery of reality by the European Commu-
nity - the discovery  that its calendar cannot be imposed on 
the real  world with impunity - has  dented the institutions. 
In a sense, Community institutions and policies have gone 
their  own  increasingly  irrelevant  ways.  At  the  same  time, 
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European Council and other arrangements under the Davignon 
formula, the European Monetary System and many less visible 
but  equally  important  developments  in  other  areas  can  be 
listed.  However,  as  this  dual  development  proceeded,  the 
institutions  and  policies  of  the  Community  lost  relevance; 
worse  still,  as  they  lost  relevance,  the  burden  which  they 
imposed on their member states began to weigh more heavily. 
Opposition to Community institutions and policies is growing, 
and it obscures recognition of real progress at the margin of 
these institutions as well as of the European interest. Increas-
ingly, we approach an explosive situation in which enlargement 
may  begin  to  be  coupled  by a  tendency  towards  shrinkage. 
Radical measures may be taken by members, a refusal to obey 
Court decisions, the withholding of Community resources, the 
introduction of new non-tariff barriers. We may yet experience 
the ultimate crisis of a break-up of the European Community, 
and we may see it happen in the next twelve months. 
This is  why it is  so important to concentrate the mind on 
the  potential  of  what  I  have  called,  with  the  appropriate 
question mark, a Third Europe. The ingredients which I have 
mentioned are very general; much technical work would have 
to  go  into  their development.  Resistance  to  change  will be 
strong;  pressure  would  have  to  build  up  in  unprecedented 
ways.  But  there  are  alternatives.  It is  possible  to  save  the 
European  construction  from  the  absurdities  of  its  original 
policies, and even the shortcomings of its original institutions. 
Europe is  too important to let it slide into the hands of the 
vested interests of ultimately insignificant groups. Let us hope 
that the budget debate at the Dublin Council and the threat 
of bankruptcy of the Agricultural Fund will concentrate minds 
on the need  to bring policies  and institutions into line with 
the  remarkable political  progress  which has  been made,  and 
create that Third Europe for which there is such urgent need. 
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